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I.
REPLY ARGUMENT
A.

In The Absence Of Any Textual Support In The Language Ofl.C. § 63-602W(4) Itself,
Or As Otherwise Ascertained From Underlying Legislative Intent, The District Court's
Construction Of That Statute Must Be Rejected

On the first question presented on this appeal, Ada County has defended the decision of the
district court on an issue that it never actually raised before that court, or in any of the earlier
administrative proceedings. The district court, sua sponte raised and decided, the issue that the Idaho
Legislature's alleged intentional use of the definite article "the," rather than the indefinite article, "a,"
in its enactment of subsection (4) to LC. § 63-602W in 2012 was determinative in that court's
construction of that subsection as limiting the extent of the site improvement tax exemption to only,
"the land developer who made the site improvements."
The just-quoted language does not appear on the face of that statute, nor in any related
statutory definition, nor is that implied language supported by the context of the entire statutory
regime itself. Ironically, in phrasing this issue on this appeal, the Appellant Jayo Development left
out at least one definite article, and several other modifiers, which are indicated in brackets in the
restatement of that issue that is set out below:
2.

Whether the district court in [the] aid of [its] statutory interpretation [ofJ LC.
§ 63-602W(4) impermissibly relied upon "implied" language, ("the land
developer who made the site improvements"), that neither appears on the face
of the statute itself, nor finds any textual support in any other part of that law?
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In addressing this question, Ada County admits the absence of any statutory definition in
support of the district court's construction of the statute (Respondent's brief, pg. 5), but then turns
to the "purpose and intent" of the legislature, as revealed by a partial quote from the Statement of
Purpose that accompanied the bill by which subsection ( 4) to I.C. § 63-602W was first enacted in
2012. That language, as set out on page 5 of Ada County's Respondent's Brief (a complete copy of
that Statement of Purpose was attached as Exhibit C to the July 31, 2013 Affidavit of Michael R.
Jones (R., pg. 57)), and as again stated here, declares:
In the proposed bill, that portion of value created by the site improvements in the
course of a land developer's business is exempt from property tax until a building
begins or the title is conveyed from the land developer.
Statement of Purpose, H.B. 519, 61 st Idaho Legislature, Second Regular Session (2012) (emphasis
added).
Ada County's argument, as set out at the bottom of page 5 and continuing to the top of page
6 of its Respondent's brief, is well taken. It is the creation of the site improvements that enhance
the value of the raw land which is the focus of the tax exemption that is at issue on this appeal.
While the language used in the 2012 statute was intended to achieve that result, it also
unintentionally excluded individuals, such as Doug Jayo, who was the principal owner and investor
in both Jayo Construction and Jayo Development. The investment and value created by the site
improvements at issue remained just as much a part of Jayo Development, as it was a part of Jayo
Construction. This is exactly what was addressed in the 2013 clarification amendment, which point
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will be further addressed later in this Reply Brief.
It is important to stay focused on the basis of the district court's decision on this particular
point, which was that the Idaho Legislature allegedly made an intentional choice concerning the
statutory language of subsection (4) ofl.C. § 63-602W to use, "the," rather than, "a" to modify, "land
developer," so as to only indicate "the land developer who made the site improvements," and to
exclude all others. Therefore, the Appellant Jayo Development believes it was rather careless of this
same legislature to use both modifiers in the same sentence to describe that same developer in the
excerpt from the Statement of Purpose upon which Ada County now relies, as highlighted in the
excerpt set out just above. At best, this reference creates some ambiguity. At worst, it cast doubts
as to the underlying basis for the district court's entire analysis, which seems rather dubious to begin
with.
Finally, in the last two paragraphs of the argument it makes on page 6 of its Respondent's
Brief Ada County first asks what it apparently only intended to be a rhetorical question:
In the event any land developer holding the site improvements is entitled to the
exemption until the property is sold, then when does the value of the site
improvements ever become taxable?
(Italicized emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis added). The answer to this question
seems self-evident. It is when the property is sold, which is implicit in the very purpose of the
business of the land developer!! To better understand this, it may be worthwhile to again examine
that actual language of subsection (4) which addresses the loss of the exemption:
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(4) Site improvements that are associated with land, such as roads and
utilities, on real property held by the land developer, either as owner or vendee in
possession under a land sale contract, for sale or consumption in the ordinary course
of the land developer's business until other improvements, such as buildings or
structural components of buildings, are begun or the real property is conveyed to a
third party. For purposes of this subsection, a transfer of title to real property to a
legal entity of which at least fifty percent (50%) is owned by the land developer, the
land developer's original entity or the same principals who owned the land
developer's original entity shall not be considered a conveyance to a third party.
[The remainder ofthe subsection, which has been omitted, addresses how the amount
of the exemption is to be determined] ....
I.C. § 63-602W(4) (bracketed reference added).
Ada County's final argument, as made at the bottom of page 6 of its brief is, "To read the
statute as urged by Appellant would be not only unreasonable but would significantly enlarge the
scope of the exemption." Respondent's Brief at pg. 6. Jayo Development's argument is based upon
the amendments to I.C. § 63-602W(4) that were actually adopted by the Idaho Legislature in 2013
and that are now the law. Whether or not the effect of this amendment actually did enlarge the scope
of the exemption or not, or whether Ada County actively opposed that amendment, is now a moot
point. At the time de novo review before the district court was commenced, the case was decided
by that court, and this appeal was brought, the position advocated by the Appellant Jayo
Development was the law of Idaho, as adopted by the Idaho Legislature.
Whatever minimal support may have ever existed for the district court's construction of the
subsection (4) of LC.§ 63-602W, as originally enacted in 2012, had been entirely eliminated by the
time the de novo review before the district court had been commenced after the 2013 clarifying

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF -PAGE 8

amendment had been enacted, and administrative Rule 620 had been allowed to lapse. Therefore,
this Court should reverse the decision of the district court denying Jayo Development the 2012 site
improvement tax exemption.

B.

Because The District Court Was Bound By The De Novo Standard Of Review Under
J.C.§ 63-3812(c), The Fact Rule 620 Was No Longer In Effect, And Had In Fact Been
Superseded By The 2013 Amendments to J.C.§ 63-602W(4) At The Time That Court
Undertook Its Review Of This Case, Was Controlling As To Its Decision
On the second question that Ada County has addressed in its Respondent's Brief, concerning

the district court's application and continued reliance upon the then-lapsed Rule 620 at the time it
rendered its decision on de novo review, Ada County has argued that, "Appellant has not cited any
case law holding that appellate courts are to take into account the expiration of an administrative
regulation when making a decision on appeal." See, Respondent's Brief at pg. 7, last sentence
(Italicized emphasis in original).
When Jayo Development filed its initial Petition for Judicial Review before the district court
on April 30, 2013, it noted in the second paragraph of that petition that, "This petition for judicial
review shall be determined upon a trial de novo, as provided by LC.§ 63-3812(c)." (R., pg. 5). 1 An

That subsection ofl.C. § 63-3812 provides as follows:
(c) Appeals may be based upon any issue presented by the appellant to the
board of tax appeals and shall be heard and determined by the court without a jury
in a trial de novo on the issues in the same manner as though it were an original
proceeding in that court. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking
affirmative relief to establish that the decision made by the board of tax appeals is
erroneous. A preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden of
proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief and the
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appeal upon a trial de novo means that the case was to be tried before the district court as if it had
never been heard before. Turner v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 211, 159 P.3d 840, 848
(2007), citing to, Gilbert v. Moore, l 08 Idaho 165, 168, 697 P .2d 1178, 1182 (1985). The judicial
review statute, LC.§ 63-3812(c), as set out in the footnote below, declares that the appeal will be
heard "in the same manner as though it were an original proceeding in that court." Inherent in such
a trial de novo proceeding is the ability to present evidence that was either not presented, or was not
available, in the earlier administrative proceedings. See, I.C. § 63-3812(c) and Canyon County

Board of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 143 Idaho 58, 60, 137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006)
("Where the district court conducts a trial de novo in an appeal of a BTA decision, this Court defers
to the district court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, .... ").
Jayo Development already has set out in its opening brief on this appeal the chronology of
events that existed at the time it filed its Petition for Review before the district court in 2013, and
the then-known effect of the legislative action that had been taken by the 2013 Idaho Legislature on
Rule 620, as expressly declared in the Statement of Purpose to that 2013 legislation. That single
paragraph from Jayo Development's opening brief is again restated here:

burden of going forward with the evidence shall shift as in other civil litigation. The
court shall render its decision in writing, including therein a concise statement of the
facts found by the court and conclusions oflaw reached by the court. The court may
affirm, reverse or modify the order, direct the tax collector of the county or the state
tax commission to refund any taxes found in such appeal to be erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected or may direct the collection of additional taxes in
proper cases.
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Jayo Development Inc.' s petition for de novo review by the district court was
filed on April 30, 2013 (R., pg. 4), shortly after the 2013 Idaho Legislature had
adjourned on April 4, 2013. The 2013 clarifying amendments to I.C. § 63-602W(4)
became law on April 4, 2013 without the governor's signature, retroactive to January
1, 2013. See, 2013 Ida.Sess.L, Ch. 276, § 2, pg. 715. A portion of the Statement of
Purpose that accompanied the 2013 clarifying amendments declared in respect to this
question that:
The State Tax Commissioners voted in November 2012 to allow the
Site Improvement temporary administrative rule 620T to expire.
They did not approve a permanent administrative rule with the
recommendation that new legislation this session would provide the
needed clarification.
Statement of Purpose, H.B. 242, Sixty Second Idaho Legislation, First Session (2013)
(R., pg. 59).
Jayo Development's Appellant's Brief at pp. 24-25.
Ada County has further argued that, "Appellant has failed to cite any expression oflegislative
intent indicating that the Idaho Legislature intended for the expiration of Rule 620 to have any
retroactive effect on decisions regarding exemption for tax year 2012." See, Respondent's Brief, at
pg. 8. Of course, the just-cited declaration that was made in the Statement of Purpose to the 2013
"clarifying amendment," is certainly an expression of legislative intent as to the "needed
clarification" as to the original intent of the 2012 enactment of the exemption. But perhaps more to
the point are the long-standing rules of law that apply in this situation, first as summarized in

Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 21 P.3d 890 (2001):
An agency construction will not be followed if it contradicts the clear
expression of the legislature. Rim View Trout Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819,824,
828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992). In other words, if the language is unambiguous, an
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agency's interpretation contrary to the plain meaning of the statute will not be given
deference. Id. at 824, 828 P.2d at 853. If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and this Court need merely apply
the statute. Kootenai Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 127 Idaho
432,435,901 P.2d 1333, 1336 (1995) ....
135 Idaho at 572, 21 P.3d at 894. This rule is buttressed by the related principle that a court should
not enforce an agency regulation that is nothing more than an attempt to re-write a statute. Moses

v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 118 Idaho 676, 680-81, 799 P.2d 964, 968-69 (1990) and Bogner
v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 856, 693 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1984).
In sum, at the time de novo review was commenced before the district court, Rule 620 had
lapsed in deference to the legislative clarification of LC. § 63-602W(4), which had become law
almost a month before Jayo Development filed its Petition for Judicial Review. As argued below
in further reply to the response of Ada County on this appeal, those 2013 amendments to that statute
operated to clarify the meaning of subsection (4) to I.C. § 63-602W, as originally enacted in 2012,
and therefore should operate and be given effect to Jayo Development's tax exemption claim for the
2012 tax year.

C.

The Rule On The Application Of "Clarifying Amendments," And The Rule On
Retroactive Application Of New Laws, Are Separate Rules Of Statutory Construction
That Are To Be Independently Applied
Ada County has cited and relied upon a California U.S. District Court decision, which itself

construes and applies California law, in rebuttal to the Idaho law that was cited and relied upon by
Jayo Development in its opening brief concerning the 2013 clarification amendment to LC. § 63-
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602W(4). See, Respondent's Brief, at pp. 10-11. As a general rule Idaho courts are not bound by
the Idaho federal court's interpretation ofldaho law, much less being bound by a California federal
court's interpretation of unrelated California law. See, Castorena v. General Electric, 149 Idaho
609,620,238 P.3d 209,220 (2010) ("This Court is not bound by federal courts' interpretations of
Idaho law, see State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 76, 685 P.2d 814, 817 (1984), such interpretations
have no precedential authority with this Court. Furthermore, we disagree with the Adams court's
analysis. [referring to the cited analysis of the U.S. District Court for Idaho in, Adams v. Armstrong

World Industries, 596 F.Supp. 1407 (D.Idaho 1984), rev 'don other grounds by, 847 F.2d 589 (9th
Cir.1988) ]").
As based upon this cited California authority, Ada County has then argued that the Idaho
Legislature's declaration as to its own intent, as set out in the Legislature's Statement of Purpose to
the 2013 clarifying amendment (R., pg. 59) is not determinative of the legislature's intent. See,
Respondent's Brief, at pg. 11. While legislative history in Idaho has always been rather scant, these
"Statements of Purpose," have been in use by the Idaho Legislature for well over forty years and
have in fact been relied upon by the courts for "guidance" as to legislative intent in a variety of
contexts. See e.g., Farmers National Bankv. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853,860, n.4, 318
P.3d 622,629 n. 4 (2014) ((J., J. Jones, dissenting). In addition to the 2013 Statement of Purpose,
a sampling of the testimony provided recorded before the germane legislative committees (R., pp.
61-73) confirmed the clarifying purpose behind the 2013 amendment to subsection (4) of LC.§ 63-
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602W(4) concerning the conveyance language. See, Appellant's Brief at pp. 20-21. There is little
else in the way oflegislative history in Idaho upon which to rely.2
Both the original enactment of subsection (4) ofI.C. § 63-602W in 2012, and the 2013
clarification amendment to that subsection, were passed the Idaho Legislature with "retroactivity
clauses." The 2012 Act declared:
SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and
approval, and retroactively to January 1, 2012.
Chapter 192 of the Laws of 2012, § 3 at pg. 519. And the 2013 Act likewise declared:
SECTION 2. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and

Justice Jim Jones, in dissent, in Farmers National Bank v. Green River Dairy,
commented as follows:
2

Although the statement of purpose that accompanies a piece of legislation
may not always be the best source for determining legislative intent, this Court has
often looked to the statement of purpose for guidance. In KGF Development, LLC
v. City ofKetchum, 149 Idaho 524, 236 P .3d 1284(2010), we looked to the statement
of purpose accompanying a bill to determine the Legislature's intent behind a statute,
as well as a city's statement of purpose for an ordinance to determine the intent
behind the ordinance. Id. at 528-29, 236 P.3d at 1288-89. Likewise, in Stuart v.
State, 149 Idaho 35, 44, 46,232 P.3d 813,822,824 (2010), we placed reliance on a
legislative statement of purpose in determining legislative intent. Here, the
Statement of Purpose is consistent with statements made before legislative
committees by the bill's sponsor, a respected member of the Legislature. While
opposition statements focus on the efficacy of the language in the bill to accomplish
the stated intent, there is no dispute as to the intended purpose of the bill.
155 Idaho at 860, n.4, 318 P.3d at 629 n. 4 (J., J. Jones, dissenting).
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approval, and retroactively to January 1, 2013.
Chapter 276 of the Laws of 2013, § 2 at pg. 715.
Both of the two retroactivity clauses as contained in each of these enactments is squarely
within the authority conferred under I.C. § 73-101. What the Appellate Jayo Development has
argued for on this appeal, as supported by the Idaho authority cited in its opening brief, is supported
by the general authority provided by Sutherland on Statutory Construction, as also cited in its
opening brief. The Sutherland treatise declares:
An amendment which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute must be
accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act, where the
amendment was adopted soon after the controversy arose concerning the proper
interpretation of the statute. This has led courts to logically conclude that a [sic]
amendment was adopted to make plain what the legislation had been all long from
the time of the statute's original enactment.
lA Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 22:31 Construction ofamendatory acts-Defects in original
act. Although not cited by Sutherland, State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 123, 294 P.3d 1132, 1135

(2012) cites the general proposition that, "the legislature also makes amendments to clarify or
strengthen the existing provisions of a statute," and citing in support, Pearl v. Bd. of Prof'!
Discipline ofIdaho State Bd. ofMed., 137 Idaho 107, 113-14, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168-69 (2002); State
v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378,384, 987P.2d290, 296 (1999); Stonecipherv. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731,

735, 963 P .2d 1168, 1172 ( 1998); State ex rel. Wright v. Headrick, 65 Idaho 148, 156, 13 9 P .2d 761,
763 (1943); and In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58from Rural High School District No. 1,
34 Idaho 222, 228-29, 200 P. 138, 139 (1921) ("However, every change of phraseology does not
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indicate a change of substance and intent. The change may be made to express more clearly the same
intent or improve the diction, or it may be the result of oversight or carelessness.").
In sum, the "express retroactivity" of a statute by means of legislative declaration, and the
"clarification" of a statute by operation of law, involve two separate and distinct questions of
statutory construction. The fact that the entire 2013 statute was made retroactive to January 1, 2013
in its operation in no way affects the question of whether the changes in the "conveyance" language
in the 2013 amendment were simply intended by the legislature to clarify how that statute was to
operate from the time it was originally enacted in 2012 and therefore should be given effect from the
date of that original enactment, as of January 1, 2012. Therefore, Jayo Development should be
extended the full benefit of the site improvement tax exemption from the time of its first enactment
in 2012.

D.

Ada County Is Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorney Fees Under J.C.§ 12-117(1) On
This Appeal
Ada County, should it prevail on this appeal, has requested an award of attorney's fees under

LC. § 12-117( 1) on the basis that, "Appellant ignores well settled law on the authority of a court to
rely on an agency regulation construing a statute and on the retroactive application of a statutory
amendment." See, Respondent's Brief at pg. 12.
Ada County's request for attorney's fees should be denied. At the time the de novo appellate
review before the district court was commenced in this case, the administrative rule upon which Ada
County and the district court have relied had lapsed and become a nullity in express deference to the
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legislative action taken by the 2013 Idaho Legislature. See, Statement of Purpose to H.B. 242, SixtySecond Idaho Legislature, 1st Sess (2013) (R., pg. 59) ("The State Tax Commissioners voted in
November 2012 to allow the Site Improvement temporary administrative rule 620T to expire. They
did not approve a permanent administrative rule with the recommendation that new legislation this
session would provide the needed clarification.").
There is no support in the record for the district court's construction of the statute. Ada
County's continued reliance upon the administrative rule after the definitive action taken by the 2013
Idaho legislature flies in the face of the settled rules oflaw that an agency's construction oflaw will
not be followed if it contradicts the clear expression of the legislature, or if it is nothing more than
an attempt to re-write the statute. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 572, 21 P .3d
890 894 (2001); and Moses v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 118 Idaho 676, 680-81, 799 P.2d 964,
968-69 (1990). Here the legislative record supports the 2013 amendment as a clarification of the
2012 enactment of subsection (4) to LC. § 63-602W entitling the Appellant Jayo Development to
the site improvement tax exemption. Consequently, Ada County's request for an award of attorney's
fees should be denied.
II.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court denying Jayo Development, Inc. the site improvement
property tax exemption for 2012 should be reversed. Jayo Development should be awarded its costs
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and attorney's fees incurred in bringing this appeal.

Respectfully Submitted this 8th day of July, 2014.

Jones
Attorney for the Appellant
Jayo Development, Inc.
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